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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Fischl's recent survey of Critical Legal Studies (CLS)'
is both informative and provocative. In it, he compares scientific
jurisprudence with legal realism and discusses their relation to CLS.2
Fischl raises several challenging questions regarding legal conventions
but makes the point that CLS is a diverse literature.3 He further
* Robert A. Black is an Associate Professor of Economics at King College, Bristol,
Tennessee.
** Rosalie S. Kreider is an Assistant Professor of Legal Studies at Drexel University,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
*** Mark Sullivan is a Hearing Officer in the Philadelphia Family Court; M.B.A. 1988,
Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1. Fischl, Some Realism about Critical Legal Studies, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 505 (1987).
2. See id. at 510-13. As Fischl puts it:
CLS combines a progressive political critique with a skeptical jurisprudence.
The political critique espouses the view that our society and its institutions fall
dramatically short of our democratic and egalitarian ideals. The skeptical
jurisprudence forthrightly embraces the indeterminacy argument and rejects the
claim that the reasoning judges use to justify the results they reach can, in fact,
compel those results.
Id. at 524 (footnotes omitted).
3. This diversity may come from the members of the CLS themselves. "Over 150 of us
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remarks that CLS is noted, not for its "broad pronouncements," but
for the "'details' of our scholarly treatments of the rich texture of
moral values and ideological assumptions reflected in legal doctrine,
our specific prescriptions for legal education, and, perhaps most
importantly, what goes on each day in our classrooms." 4 Thus, one
who reviews CLS literature should focus on its details of legal doc-
trine, its prescriptions for legal education, and its employment in the
law school classroom, rather than on its generalities.
This Essay addresses one of those details: a classroom example
that Fischl uses to facilitate student discussion.5 In this example, a
widget-factory laborer takes home, at the end of the day, the output
produced rather than a wage. Fischl is concerned with exploring
alternatives to the usual pattern of employer-owned output, but his
example of labor-owned output has economic implications that he
leaves largely unexplored. The discussion below examines the eco-
nomic implications of what we call Fischl's "value-added-by-labor"
approach 6 to property rights. By exploring the economic theory of
the firm,7 we show why even laborers probably will prefer the tradi-
tional employer-owned approach to product property rights. Exam-
ining some practical aspects of the economics of production and
distribution will show conditions under which labor-owned output is
an inefficient and unworkable alternative to employer-owned output.8
identify ourselves with the movement [CLS], and I suspect that there are about that many
positions among us on any given concrete issue." Id. at 507 (footnotes omitted).
4. Id.
5. See id. at 527.
6. This term for the property-rights scheme is based on an exegesis of Fischl's example, in
which property rights are transferred to labor, as value is added to raw materials or
intermediate products. See infra Section IV(A).
7. The economic theory of the firm is a diverse literature. For a thorough discussion of
the theory of the firm, see A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1920); Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). For a later discussion on the theory of the firm,
see Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM.
ECON. REv. 777 (1972). See infra Section III.
8. According to Fischl, the "major aim of CLS . . . is to open up such subjects to
democratic examination and debate." Fischl, supra note 1, at 528. It is an exaggeration, but
nevertheless an illustrative one, to say that we view a debate on employee-owned versus
employer-owned output in the same way we would view a debate as to whether the sun is the
most efficient way to heat the earth. The point is that the scope of reasonable debate on this
issue is probably much narrower than Fischl probably acknowledges. Where his scheme of
assigning property rights could work, the market often provides for it without democratic
intervention. In the majority of modem production processes, however, the scheme is simply




II. FISCHL'S HYPOTHETICAL WIDGET-FACTORY WORKER
From an economic standpoint, Professor Fischl's classroom
example involving the widget-factory worker is perhaps the most pro-
vocative part of his article.9 In the example, a widget factory worker
takes home her widgets instead of wages and gives her boss "an
amount in cash equal to the cost of the necessary materials and their
procurement, the reasonable rental value of her workspace and tools,
and the apportioned cost of other managerial expenses. She then
leaves the shop.. . planning to sell them and keep the profit." 10
Fischl uses this example to prompt classroom discussion of the
underpinnings of labor law. When he asks the class what will happen
to the worker, the students answer that the boss will sue the employee
or have the police arrest her. Fischl continues his discussion:
I then ask why the employer is not guilty of the same miscon-
duct when he pays the employee a reasonable "rent" for her labor,
keeps the widgets for himself and sells them for his own profit.
There is more stirring and murmurings until someone finally says,
"Because the widgets belong to the employer-the law says that
they're his property."
Why should that be, I ask. After all, there is nothing "neces-
sary" about permitting the employer to "rent" the worker and
keep the widgets; why not structure the relationship the other way
around? When someone objects that, if we did that, "then we
wouldn't have capitalism," I reply that's exactly my point.0' 1] The
law reflects and enforces a core assumption about the relationship
between employer and employee in a market economy: the
employee's legally protected interest in his job is limited to his
wage, while the employer is accorded the exclusive right to both
the widgets and the profits to be earned from their sale. 2
This example illustrates a main contention of CLS adherents:
that in Fischl's words, "[W]hat we think of as 'natural' forms of
9. Fischl, supra note 1, at 527; see Challenging the Law's Unstated Assumptions, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 30, 1987, § 4, at E6, col. 3.
10. Fischl, supra note 1, at 527.
11. Fischl believes that a value-added-by-labor approach to property rights in production
would lead to the breakdown of capitalism. What is really at stake, however, is the breakdown
of modern economies, because all modern economies are based upon systems of production
that depend on specialization and a division of labor.
12. Fischl, supra note 1, at 527. Actually, the employer has the right to either the widgets
or the profits; as Fischl's statement recognizes, one must be traded for the other. The
statement also assumes that the firm actually will earn a profit. But the right to earn profits
also includes the responsibility for loss and the potential for delays in sales and revenues due to
seasonal or cyclical fluctuations in demand. If the key issue is the right to the profits, then it is
crucial also to consider the possibility of loss and the worker's willingness to bear such losses.
See infra Section VI.
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human association are often simply a reflection of unexamined social
conventions or constructs that are, in turn, embodied in and rein-
forced by the law."' 13 The premise, therefore, is that the law "conceals
the removal of important social issues from the arena of democratic
choice."' 4 Supposedly, CLS is concerned with exposing and explor-
ing these issues.
In CLS, no underlying assumptions regarding legal entitlements
are immune from attack.'" Fischl states: "We might want to con-
sider the current arrangement [of legal entitlements] in light of our
democratic and egalitarian aspirations and ask whether it exacts too
great a cost in terms of the self-determination and the bargaining
power of working people." From an economist's perspective, it is to
Fischl's credit that he then goes on to say, "Or we might conclude
that employer ownership provides advantages in terms of investment
incentives and transaction efficiencies, and therefore decide that we
prefer to leave things the way they are." 16
III. PRODUCTION, THE THEORY OF THE FIRM,
AND LABOR CONTRACTS
Fischl implies that the traditional economic structure of labor
law regarding property rights is an "unexamined social convention
... embodied in and reinforced by the law."' 7 Because of the practi-
cality of these social conventions, it is easy for both the employer and
the laborer in the modern and complex environment of production
and distribution to take them for granted. The point is that modern
production is increasingly complex because of specialization, the divi-
sion of labor, and team production. Specialization and the complexity
of production make employer-owned output an efficient arrangement,
as will be shown. These factors also contribute to the efficiency of
producing that output by what we call firms.'"
The firm is not the only way to organize modern production.
One alternative is a subcontracting process in which no ongoing rela-
tionship between the inputs is expected once production is complete.
13. Fischl, supra note 1, at 526.
14. Id. at 531. Apparently, Fischl is willing to allow laborers to take the products home,
as long as this is negotiated by the employer and employee. But Fischl also seems ready to go
further than this, perhaps by interfering with freedom of contract in the name of "democratic
choice." To what extent and for what purpose should such interference be allowed?
15. Id. at 528.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 526.
18. See A. MARSHALL, supra note 7, at 240. Marshall notes that Adam Smith gave new




Another alternative is for one worker to do the job from start to fin-
ish. Thus, for the consumer attempting to build a house, he has sev-
eral options for organizing production. The consumer could do the
work himself, or he could subcontract for the various tasks and the
necessary materials. Alternatively, the consumer could hire an agent
to gather the materials and to organize the workers and other inputs.
This agent could then subcontract the work, or the agent could organ-
ize-or may already have organized-a firm with long-term relations
with input suppliers to build a number of houses.
The distinction between the occasional subcontracting associa-
tions and the longer-term associations of the firm is an important one.
Coase was the first to suggest that firms are distinguished by the long-
term contracts they enter into with suppliers of raw materials, land,
labor, and capital. 19 Faith and his co-authors explain Coase's neoclas-
sical view of the firm:
The firm is seen as an institution that economizes on transac-
tions costs. It is defined as a collection of contracts between input
owners and the owner(s) of the firm where multilateral contracting
among resource owners is replaced by bilateral contracting
between each resource owner and the firm. This ... reduces trans-
actions costs because it reduces the number of formal contracts
required for productive activity.20
With respect to the firm's use of labor, the firm offers and prefers
to pay a wage over the long term, in exchange for the right to assign
the worker to different jobs over the life of the contract.21 Why can a
firm with the right to assign a laborer to different tasks produce more
cheaply than production by subcontract? In increasingly complex
production processes, the degree of specialization is high, and the
number of subcontracts would be large. The negotiation costs associ-
ated with numerous and frequent subcontracts would be expensive for
the final buyer. To avoid this, the firm, as the agent of the buyer of
the product, replaces production-by-subcontracting and organizes
production over the long term. By doing this, the firm reduces trans-
actions costs and, therefore, is able to sell its product more cheaply
than by using the subcontracting process.22
19. See Coase, supra note 7, at 391-92.
20. Faith, Higgins & Tollison, Managerial Rents and Outside Recruitment in the Coasian
Firm, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 660 (1984).
21. See Coase, supra note 7, at 390-91; see also 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 218-19 (1985). The assignment of a worker to a specific task
gives the employer flexibility and the employee more strict performance requirements.
22. See generally Coase, supra note 7, at 390-91 (discussing the costs of negotiating
separate contracts and a firm's desire to enter into long-term contracts).
1988]
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Reduced transaction costs is not the firm's only benefit. The firm
also tends to foster team production that is more efficient than the
subcontracting process, in which associations among complementary
inputs are brief.23 During team production in complex processes,
however, individual productivity is hard to measure, and shirking
may become a problem that necessitates monitoring of individual pro-
ductivity. Monitoring, however, is also subject to shirking. One com-
mentator has addressed this issue: "Firms deal with the monitoring
problem by establishing a specialized monitoring input that is com-
mon to all input contracts and that can renegotiate individual con-
tracts. The incentives of this specialized input are controlled by
making it a residual claimant.
24
When the production process is less complex, however, subcon-
tracting may be less expensive because the subcontractors may have
more incentive not to shirk than do the firm's laborers. Thus, the
gains of the firm depend on the complexity of the production process
and the costs of transactions. These costs include not only production
agreements, but also marketing and distribution agreements.25
The preceding discussion raises an important question: Why
would a laborer agree to contract with a firm if it means forfeiting his
ability to decide where and when to work? The worker usually finds
it more convenient to specialize because the resulting increase in pro-
ductivity means higher earnings. Other laborers with similar skills,
however, may not agree to be part of a subcontracting production
process. The subcontracting process may even be quite inefficient. In
a review of production by hierarchies, one commentator has noted:
Williamson ... demonstrates that, in principle, even Adam
Smith's pin factory could be operated by a series of independent
specialist-entrepreneurs, one for each processing step. But the fac-
tory's efficiency would be impaired by the need to maintain sub-
stantial inventory buffers between each step to handle absences and
negotiation delays and by the relative inflexibility of a division of
labour based on property rights in work assignments. To co-ordi-
nate transactions with the pin factory, a hierarchy is more efficient
than a market.26
23. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 7, at 779.
24. Id. "Residual claimant" refers to the entrepreneur's right to the profit of the firm.
The entrepreneur is the monitor and profit is an incentive to prevent the monitor from
shirking. See id. at 782.
25. In general, the larger the firm becomes relative to local demand, the more widespread
the market must be and the greater is the importance of an efficient marketing and distribution
network. Costs of such agreements will be shown to affect the workability of labor-owned
output. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
26. Jorgenson, Hafsi & Kiggunou, Towards a Market Imperfections Theory of
[Vol. 43:343
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For the laborer, then, the firm may offer the best-, opportunity for
steady employment and a high wage. The laborer's choice between
firm and self-employment, therefore, depends on the probability of
increased productivity in the firm and the laborer's taste for
independence.
This raises another issue with respect to one's view of the firm:
Should the firm be viewed as an exploitative agent seeking its own
interests, or as an organizing agent seeking the interests of consumers?
One may view the former as dangerous to labor and the latter as bene-
ficial to labor. The "exploiting" firm may be perceived as suppressing
wages while the "organizing" firm may be perceived as increasing
productivity and the return to labor. One's view of the firm also
affects his view of the distribution of output. Thus, while Marxian
economics views distribution in terms of class conflict, Marshall con-
tended that profits would be shared27 among all of the factors of pro-
duction. This implies that, even without the rights to output or to the
residual, labor will share both profits and losses with the other
resource suppliers in the firm.
IV. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PRODUCTION
To properly analyze Fischl's property-rights scheme, the scheme
must be distinguished from traditional property rights systems.
Under the traditional scheme, property rights to the output of pro-
duction are usually assigned to the employer. Two points must be
noted, however. First, while this scheme28 is the most common sys-
tem of rights to the product, it is not the universal scheme as Fischl's
discussion might suggest.29 Second, Fischl's preferred scheme of
assigning rights to the laborer is not precluded under current legal
Organizational Structure in Developing Countries, 23 J. MGMT. STUD. 417, 421 (1986); see T.
AsHTON, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND: THE 18TH CENTURY 103 (1955).
27. This is particularly true in the short run. See A. MARSHALL, supra note 7, at 625-28.
For a discussion of the sharing of "quasi-rents"-returns to factors temporarily fixed in
supply-among laborers and other resource suppliers and owners, see id. According to
Marshall, laborers with some experience in the firm will earn what he called quasi-rents
because their experience makes them a factor which is temporarily fixed in supply. The level
of these quasi-rents depends on the level of profits; they may be negative if a loss is incurred.
Id. To Marshall, then, the division of quasi-rents entails "defacto some sort of profit and loss
sharing between almost every business and its employees." Id. at 627. See also 0.
WILLIAMSON, supra note 21, at 248-49, 263 (discussing employee bargaining for quasi-rents);
Miyazaki; Internal Bargaining, Labor Contracts, and a Marshallian Theory of the Firm, 74
AM. ECON. REV. 381, 381-93 (1984) (discussing profit sharing within the firm).
28. See 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 21, at 218 (discussing the capitalist mode of
production in which a single party owns all inventories including finished goods).
29. See Fischl, supra note 1, at 528.
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convention.3 o
A. Fischl's Value-Added Scheme
Although Fischl's method of assigning property rights is not
clearly laid out in his article, some attention must be given to specify-
ing the assignment scheme implied by his example. The underlying
scheme appears to be based on value added by labor in the production
process. "Value added" refers to the higher market price that can be
had for inputs of raw materials and intermediate product after labor,
capital, and land are combined with them in production. Thus, value
added results from a change in form and location. Since, in Fischl's
example, property rights are transferred after labor is applied, this
approach may be referred to as the "value-added-by-labor" scheme.
Ashton 31 gives examples of industries in 18th century Britain in
which traditions were such that the worker received a share of the
product of his labor. For example, coal-hewers and coal-meters
received a portion of coal by custom, as did ironworkers whose firms
used coal. This practice was not limited to the distribution of coal,
however. West Indiamen's mates kept the sweepings of sugar and
coffee from the hold ships; the gangsmen claimed a right to the molas-
ses sugar on the warehouse floor; and corn ships' laborers claimed
title to the grain removed from the ship as samples. a2 These customs,
however, encouraged workers to handle the product improperly:
In each case the workers saw to it that the crumbs from the
master's table were ample. Casks were handled not too gently;
sacks were liable to burst open; shipwrights took care that their
wives did not go short of firewood. The line of demarcation
between the extension of established rights and barefaced robbery
... [was] difficult to draw.33
Part of this trend of paying labor a finished product rather than a
money wage was attributable to the shortage of coinage in Britain in
the 18th century.34 Regardless of the cause of this payment system,
30. Id. These are not the only possible schemes. The consumer may hold title to the
materials and the product throughout the stages of production. For example, when the
consumer commissions a custom house, he often advances money to the builder to buy
materials. In this case, it is the consumer (or his lender) who holds title to the materials and
output throughout the production process. On the other hand, the owner of the raw materials
may hold the rights throughout production. Often, however, the owner of the raw materials
also will be the employer.
31. See T. ASHTON, supra note 26, at 208.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 207-08. Another reason for paying workers in product was to prevent, or at least
deter, the impact on production of chronic alcoholism among workers. Id. at 202.
[Vol. 43:343
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however, the firm's rights often were placed in jeopardy when the
laborers' rights, with respect to the product, were vaguely defined.
Although workers on occasion have been paid in product, the
feasibility of the "value-added-by-labor" approach is by no means uni-
versally acceptable. If applied thoroughly to all production processes,
this scheme becomes strange because it apparently would allow the
person who mows the lawn to take home a portion of the mown sod.
With no restrictions on the scheme's application, the list of similar
anomalies would be endless. Furthermore, one needs to specify the
scheme before any firm will supply materials, land, machinery, and
organizational skill that labor requires for production."
Labor-owned product could be practical under certain condi-
tions, yet before the laborer will prefer the right to the product over
the wage, at least three conditions must exist. First, the production
process must not be lengthy or complex. Second, the cost of market-
ing and distribution must be low. And third, the potential gains from
owning the product must be greater than the gains from the wage.
B. Do-It- Yourself Production and Labor-Owned Output
The conditions described above are precisely the conditions asso-
ciated with do-it-yourself purchases. First, the process is relatively
"simple" because of the proximity to the end of the production line.
The buyer adds his labor to some unfinished product that he intends
to keep. This makes the process simple and such products usually
require little additional contracting. Second, the cost of marketing
and distribution is low because no marketing or distribution will be
needed. Third, the gains from owning the product are greater than
the gains from receiving the wage because the laborer intends to keep
the product. Keeping the product instead of the wage eliminates a
transaction because the wage, if it were paid, would have to be paid
back, in essence, for the product.
Do-it-yourself purchases are seen in many places in our econ-
omy. We wash cars at someone else's car wash, buy "kits" and finish
them ourselves, and assemble our own picture frames in someone
35. The precise arrangement between the worker and her boss is not clear in Fischl's
widget example. Does the worker have an ex post option to exercise, or an irrevocable ex ante
decision already made as to whether she keeps the product or takes a wage? The timing of the
decision is crucial as to whether a firm will agree to operate within this structure of property
rights; an ex post option will be unacceptable to the firm. The role of contracts, whether
explicit or implicit, is to reduce the uncertainty in the operation of a firm. Moreover, property
rights include the dual rights of exclusive use and voluntary assignment of ownership. See
DeAlessi, Property Rights, Transactions Costs, and X-Inefficiency, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 64, 66
(1983).
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else's frame shop. We add labor to the parts made by a toy manufac-
turer who finds it preferable to ship a toy unassembled, and we finish
furniture that has been assembled and assemble pre-finished furniture.
We now pump our own gas and prepare our own salads at the salad
bar.
In each of these agreements, the laborer has the title to the fin-
ished product, and the owner of the firm appears satisfied with this
arrangement. Ironically, "organized labor" may not be so content
with the arrangement because it is disenfranchised by the do-it-your-
self arrangement. Furthermore, do-it-yourself production is not effi-
cient for many products. As Adam Smith stated: "It is the maxim of
every prudent master.., never to attempt to make at home what it
will cost him more to make than to buy."' 36 The inefficiency of do-it-
yourself production is also reflected in the auto shop's facetious sign
listing the hourly labor rate as "$20 an hour if we do the work... $30
an hour if you help."
Regardless of potential inefficiences, do-it-yourself projects are
examples in which the value-added approach to property rights does
work. It remains to be shown that this approach has much wider
applicability than in the do-it-yourself context, for in some production
processes, the approach cannot reasonably be applied.
C. The Test of the Market
Despite its feasibility under certain conditions, a value-added
assignment scheme is not widely used because the test of the market
deems it to be inefficient. This test states: If a value-added scheme of
assigning rights is not illegal, 37 and if it is more efficient than the alter-
native of paying labor a wage, then the market will be dominated by
the value-added scheme. Workers everywhere will take their product
instead of a wage. Since it is apparently not illegal to arrange produc-
tion in this way, and since this scheme is not observed in most firms,
the value-added approach is impliedly inefficient.
38
Stated differently, if Fischl truly believes that efficiency is not a
legitimate basis for the employer to maintain title to the product and
to pay labor a wage, he should organize his own widget firm under a
value-added-by-labor assignment scheme. The firm will not only
36. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 424 (1776).
37. Fischl seems to imply that it is illegal though he never explicitly demonstrates this.
38. For an application of this argument in the context of production by small firms as
contrasted with large firms, see E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, MICROECONOMic THEORY
AND APPLICATIONS 274 (1986). For an application of the argument to labor-managed firms,
see 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 21, at 266.
[Vol. 43:343
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fullfill his democratic and egalitarian aspirations, but also will do as
well as, and perhaps better than, many other firms. In the event it
does better, workers will flock to his company. This will allow him to
reap his own surplus for allowing them to benefit by this arrangement.
If entry into Fischl's value-added-by-labor-scheme is easy, the market
eventually will be dominated by this kind of firm. The employer's
surplus, however, will be shortlived under easy entry conditions.
On the other hand, if labor-owned output is less efficient than the
usual method of assigning title to the product, then Fischl's firm will
be run out of business, and others will avoid this value-added-by-labor
approach. Laws and social conventions will tend to develop and insti-
tutionalize the efficient approach. Laborers also will prefer the wages
approach over accepting rights to the product because the efficiency
of this approach enables both the firm and the laborer to do better.
D. Employer-Owned Product and Efficiency in Production
Organizing firms with labor-owned product appears to fail the
test of the market because of the complexity of modem production
and the costs of marketing and distributing products. Furthermore,
the intangibility or indivisibility of certain products and the high cost
of other tangible products make labor-owned products impractical or
nearly impossible.
Consider, for a moment, a complex production process that has
multiple stages, in which value is added by successive workers at each
stage. As noted earlier, transaction costs can be reduced by the firm
that enters into long-term contracts with labor and with suppliers of
other inputs and materials. Assigning product rights to the laborers
at each stage of the production process, however, would involve many
more contracts than accepting the employer's rights to the product.
The firm formed with labor-owned output could not compete because
the burden of the extra transactions would be reflected in higher pro-
duction costs.39 For this value-added approach to succeed, labor
would have to agree to accept a lower share of the total product
because extra legal costs associated with each transaction would
reduce the net output.' While the scheme may be technically worka-
ble in firms in which a tangible product is produced, it would be too
costly for such firms to compete successfully with firms using the
traditional employer-owned approach. The only possible advantage
39. For a discussion of the difficulties with continuous contracting, see 0. WILLIAMSON,
supra note 21, at 220.
40. If Professor Fischl does not agree that more contracts cost more, we would like to hire
him as our lawyer in negotiating future contracts because the price sounds right!
1988]
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of this value-added scheme is that the firm's monitoring costs would
be reduced because the workers would have no incentive to shirk.
For firms that produce no tangible product-as in service indus-
tries-the issue is feasibility rather than cost. A value-added scheme
simply will not work in most industries in which the product is intan-
gible. Fischl's own professions, teaching and law, come to mind.
What would he hope to take home at the end of his day if not a wage
or a claim to a later wage payment? The professional athlete is
another example. What would the individual basketball player take
home at the end of the game and sell for a profit?
Distribution and marketing of the product would cause laborers
in many industries to reject labor-owned output. The reason is that
both distribution and marketing are subject to economies of large
scale-that is, per-unit costs of product marketing and distribution
fall as the amount of product involved rises.41 The employer-owned
product, therefore, can be distributed at a lower cost than the labor-
owned product when there are many laborers and one owner.42 Con-
sider the case in which the product is made in one country and sold in
another-as with automobiles, electronic equipment, and agricultural
machinery and commodities. Few laborers want to bear the cost of
marketing and distributing these products when the home market is
closed to them. The laborer would rather take the wage and leave the
profit and the reward for distribution to the firm and its agents
abroad.
Another difficulty with labor-owned product will occur if the
worker is producing an expensive product like a car. The worker may
have to borrow money to pay for the "fair market value" of a car at
the end of the week. If the worker chooses to build up credits toward
one car every four months, he may decide that the time between pay-
ments is too long. Alternatively, if several workers own a car jointly,
it may be difficult to agree upon the conditions of and the distribution
of the revenues of a subsequent sale. Money, therefore, is more con-
41. For the widget example to be practical, the difference between the firm's costs and the
laborer's costs of marketing and distributing the product must be negligible-that is, that
economies of scale do not exist in marketing and distribution. This is generally not true,
though, when production is large scale and when distribution must be accomplished over a
large area. Therefore, in large-scale production, the firm may make a profit on the the
product, while the laborer would incur a loss selling the product herself.
42. The owner will not always choose to distribute the product. The firm may instead
contract with one or more firms to act as distributors. The point is that, with labor-owned
output, each laborer would be selling a smaller quantity with higher transactions and
marketing costs per unit. For a historical recount of the the theory and practice of vertical
integration of production and distribution, see 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 21, at 103.
[Vol. 43:343
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
venient than the rights to the car and more desirable than the uncer-
tainty involved with product sales in the future.
If the value-added approach to property rights in production
seems to be the "natural" way to apportion rights, then it must be
imposed where it is not efficient. Furthermore, based on the foregoing
analysis, it probably would have to be imposed against the will of the
laborer who would prefer the wage over rights to the product. This
final point will be dramatized more fully by revisiting Fischl's exam-
ple of the widget factory worker.
V. ANOTHER LOOK AT FISCHL's HYPOTHETICAL WORKER
Fischl indicated that he uses hypothetical examples and ques-
tions in his law school classes.4" This Section will test his premise
further by redefining his widget example, and then asking more ques-
tions of the class. First, assume that the laborer makes transmission
gears for domestic automobiles each day. Will the worker still prefer
to pay the "fair market value" for other inputs into the day's output
of gears and take them home with her to sell them at a profit? Will
she spend the next day, or week, looking for a buyer? Will she spend
time contracting with the laborer who assembles the transmission,
who then will have to bargain with the laborer who installs transmis-
sions, who then will have to bargain ... ? Will the boss continue to
invest in a firm where half the day is spent working and the other half
making and remaking contracts? Will any long-term contracts that
develop between workers put the firm in essentially the same position
as the traditional assignment of rights, but with far greater transac-
tions costs?
Second, assume that the laborer works in Korea, assembling a
circuit board to be installed in a VCR headed for the U.S. market.
Will this laborer prefer the circuit boards or the wages? Will she
choose to, or be able to, sell them abroad and still work in the plant?
Does including some of the details of modem production and distri-
bution change our view of the feasibility of a value-added-by-labor
approach to product property rights?
Finally, assume that the laborer is a labor law professor. Will the
professor be able to take her product home with her at the end of the
day to sell it, even if she wanted to? Would it not be easier just to
settle for cash? Will the professor view her employer, the law school,
as a helpful agent, rather than an exploiting entrepreneur if she takes
home only her wages each month?
43. Fischl, supra note 1, at 527.
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It should be clear why this example has been redefined. The wid-
get factory laborer who takes the product home probably will decide
to return them to her boss the next day and take her wages. In gen-
eral, labor does not want property rights to the product.' The trans-
actions costs of marketing and delivering the widgets would be too
great to forego a reasonable wage for the laborer's production time.
The sales revenue may even be insufficient to cover the wages of the
laborer, let alone ensure a profit. The time involved in finding a
buyer, and the risk of finding no buyer at all, make the guaranteed
wages more desirable to the laborer than the product. Thus, the
worker will prefer to stick to production and leave the marketing and
distribution to the employer. One night of worry about the transac-
tions costs and the uncertainties of marketing the product will con-
vince the worker that her decision to take a property right in the
product was, indeed, a bad one.
VI. THE OWNER AS THE RESIDUAL CLAIMANT
When one examines the widget factory worker example closely,
it is apparent that Fischl actually is concerned about the firm as a
residual claimant." According to his example, the worker plans to
sell the widgets at a profit. Alternatively, the law supposedly reflects
the employer's right to a profit. This emphasis on profit is no doubt
related to a tendency to see the firm as an exploiter who regularly
earns an excessive profit, rather than to see the firm as an agent who
provides multiple services for the consumer. Often the firm is both
the owner of the finished product and the residual claimant; yet, the
distinction between residual claimant and owner of the product is
important because the property rights to the product do not ensure a
profit, let alone an above normal profit. 6 Many times the firm takes a
loss while still paying the worker a wage. This loss occurs in spite of
the employer's right to the product. 7
44. Worker-owned output does not seem to be an important issue to labor because labor
unions do not make this an issue during collective bargaining. The fact that it is not a legal
convention today does not prevent it from becoming an issue in contract negotiations in the
future, if labor actually thinks that it would be beneficial to workers. Once again, though, the
idea seems to fail the test of the market. See supra text accompanying note 38.
45. See supra note 24.
46. Fischl's example, on the other hand, appears to suggest that all value in the product is
profit or, at least, that all product will earn a profit. In fact, the widget factory laborer who
takes the widgets home must first recover wages and the costs of marketing and distributing
the product herself. The residual will then be profit.
47. Even without property rights, labor may share in the profits and losses of the firm. See
supra note 27. Literature on property rights focuses not on labor's right to the product but on
labor's property rights to the job itself. Rights to the job allow labor to capture more of the
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It is now increasingly common to organize' firms with the labor-
ers as owners-that is, as residual claimants." Nevertheless, the firm,
not individual laborers, usually has the property rights to the finished
product: The firm retains control of the product until it is converted
into money to be paid out as resource costs and as a residual to labor-
ers as owners. 9 The Weirton Steel company of West Virginia is one
example of a labor-owned firm. In 1983, the company was on the
brink of dissolution when Weirton's 9,500 employees voted for 100
percent employee ownership of the firm.50 Currently, Weirton Steel is
the nation's ninth largest integrated steel producer, and in November
of 1984, it earned higher operating profits per ton than any of the six
largest steel companies.51 But, even with labor as owners, the system
is more efficient when the firm retains rights to the product until final
sale. 2 Furthermore, organizing production in a labor-owned firm
does not always ensure that there will be a residual after the product
is sold. 3 Therefore, it may not be in the best interest of the laborer to
retain the rights to the product or be the residual claimant.
VII. CONCLUSIONS: REALISM, IDEALISM,
AND MODERN ECONOMIES
In much of his article, Professor Fischl argues against an ideal
conception of law. Ironically, however, Fischl implicitly-perhaps
quasi-rent attributable to "firm-specific human capital." See 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 21,
at 263.
48. For a theoretical discussion of collective ownership by workers, see 0. WILLIAMSON,
supra note 21, at 217.
49. There is an exception. It is the "communal-emh" (every man for himself) form of
collective ownership. Id. Under this organization, work stations are shared by workers who
move between stations at prescribed intervals. Id. No worker specializes, and every worker
has a claim to his own output. For this reason, the system is not considered efficient and is not
widely used today.
50. See The Workers Are Set to Buy Weirton, Bus. WK., Sept. 5, 1983, at 35. In
negotiations for ownership rights, Weirton employees relinquished annual wage increases,
vacation pay, and other benefits in order to participate in an Employee Stock Ownership
Program. Id. Thus, even labor recognized that rights to the residual come only at some
expense. In exchange, this innovative program gave Weirton employees the rights to receive
one third of the profits when the company reached 100 million dollars in equity, and fifty
percent of the profit when corporate equity reached 250 million. As shareholders, workers
also had full voting rights and more input into the production process. Making Money-And
History-At Weirton, Bus. WK., Nov. 12, 1984, at 140.
51. Id. at 136.
52. For example, Weirton steel workers who own the firm do not take rods of steel home
each night.
53. People's Express Airlines is a case in point. As a means of providing worker
incentives, labor owned 25 percent of the firm, until it went into receivership and was acquired
by a more dominant airline. See Nice Going, Frank, but Will It Fly?, Bus. WK., Sept. 29, 1986,
at 34-35.
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even unconsciously- substitutes for it an ideal conception of the
economy in which production is simple and uncertainty about sales
and marketing does not exist. His suggestion of assigning product
property rights to labor can work only in a frictionless world in which
transactions and accounting costs are zero, and in which marketing
and distribution of the product do not exhibit increasing returns to
large scale. This economy, depicted by Fischl, is indeed idealistic and
bears no resemblance to a modern economy with complex and large
scale production and distribution. Production in the real world is
often done in many stages. Sometimes products are assembled in sev-
eral different countries by many different workers. Economies of
scale in marketing and distribution do exist. And as any lawyer famil-
iar with contracts law knows, transactions costs are not zero.
What is clear in this Essay is that realism often is the basis for
legal convention. The discussion even lends support to Marx's idea
that the mode of production gives rise to the legal and social conven-
tions regarding property.54 These concessions to economic realism in
the law and to a Marxian view of the materialistic basis of certain
legal conventions, however, should not be taken as a radical stance."
In fact, it is quite clear that realism in the law, or law that conforms
itself to the necessities of modern forms of production, does not
always disadvantage the worker.56 Rather, in the world of free con-
54. Marx stated:
[N]either legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended... by
themselves or on the basis of... development of the human mind, but ... on the
contrary they originate in the material conditions of life .... The totality of...
[the] relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the
real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure ....
See K. MARX, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in K.
MARX: EARLY WRITINGS 425 (1975). See also T. ASHTON, supra note 26, at 217 (noting that
worker's drinking habits "had conformed to the requirements of industry").
55. We would not go as far as Marx does in applying this materialistic approach to all
legal and political structures. This is a thorny issue, however, and it is important to
distinguish between materialistic influences on statutes themselves, as opposed to influences on
legal conventions or on the application of the statutes. Nonetheless, some scope exists for an
economic critique in many areas of the law. For example, one of the latest issues in the
critique of statutes is the inclusion of special tax provisions for certain individuals in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.)
2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). See The Great Tax Giveway,
The Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 10-15, 1988, § IA, at 1 (criticizing individual tax breaks
provided in section 1277(c)(2)(D) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 1986 U.S.C. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 2601, and other sections of the Act.).
56. On a related point, one commentator stated: "That the development of industry ...
stimulated, and aided the achievement of, personal ambition is shown by the number of men
who began life as wage-earners and ended it as employers.... [In] the main, it would appear,
the social changes of the century derived from economic processes." See T. ASHTON, supra
note 26, at 216.
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tracts, these legal conventions appear to have the vote of laborers who
agree to take the wage and leave the product with the firm.
The communal-emh" 7 mode of production, for example, is sim-
ply no longer feasible in competition with other organizational forms
in which workers have no right to the product. The issues raised by
labor in collective bargaining recognize this reality; recent discussions
of laborers' property rights focus not on rights to the product, but on
rights to jobs themselves. As Woodbury notes, the issue of power and
property rights is important to laborers; but what concerns laborers is
"the right to dispose freely of their property, which is the ability to be
productive." 8 This does not mean the right to carry the product
home at the end of the day.
The theory of the firm illustrates that employer property rights
are taken for granted in our economic organizations because we rec-
ognize that many firms could not work any other way. In cases in
which labor-owned product could work, the market often specifies
these alternative arrangements, as in the do-it-yourself products.
Where labor-owned product cannot work, we tacitly agree not to
challenge the present system because we commonly recognize its effi-
ciency. The key point is that these property rights are not unexam-
ined features of our legal system.
It is a crucial part of a complete legal education to challenge the
young law student with these issues, however. Professor Fischl
should be commended for raising these issues in his labor-law courses,
since examining social, legal, and economic conventions, rather than
taking them for granted, is the essence of a large portion of the educa-
tion process. His hypothetical example skillfully exposes the reader's
propensity to take the property-rights convention for granted. Most
would immediately agree with the student who says that the employer
will have the employee arrested for taking home the product.
Nowhere, however, does the example state who owns the output. The
employer and employee could have had an agreement that the
employee would take the product and give the employer compensa-
tion. When we assume the worker's guilt, our preconceptions are at
work, and it is important to investigate why we hold them. The point
of this Essay is that these preconceptions are grounded in economic
efficiency, rather than in economic power: Efficiency, not the law,
assures that producer-owned output is the convention. The crucial
question to ask is not: "Why do laws allow only for employer-owned
57. See supra note 49.
58. Woodbury, Power in the Labor Market: Institutionalist Approaches to Labor Problems,
21 J. EcON. ISSUES 1781, 1781-1805 (1987).
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output?" Rather it is: "Why, in a world in which other property-
rights schemes are perfectly legal, do most employers and laborers
agree to employer-owned output?"
It appears, then, that a basic understanding of economics is also
crucial to a complete legal education, especially regarding the relation
of labor contracts to the economic theory of the firm. Moreover, in
the area of property rights and labor law, the criterion of efficiency
cannot so easily be dismissed as merely a pretext for promoting the
"particular political program . . . [of] the conservatism of so-called
laissez faire."59 Efficiency, independent of ideology, is an important
explanation of social convention in the area of labor law and property
rights. Thus, the appeal to ideology probably depends more on effi-
ciency than the appeal to efficiency depends on ideology.
59. See Fischl, supra note 1, at 523 n.63.
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